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WHITEHEAD’S INTERPRETATION OF PLATO’S 
«RECEPTACLE» AND THE PARALLELS WITH THE CONCEPT 




Alfred North Whitehead, the English mathematician, physicist, and 
philosopher (with a pronounced crossover into sociology), can be considered 
one of the eminent modern scholars who in the late 1920s and early 1930s, in 
the spirit of his process ontology, conducted a fundamental study on the 
philosophical meaning of Plato’s concept of the «receptacle» (hypodoché)1. 
Whitehead was of the opinion that our reactions to impulses from the external 
world are primarily of an emotional nature2. He started out from the method 
of mathematical generalisation, and on the basis of previous logical-
philosophical investigations of mathematical relations3 he believed that on the 
precondition of a primordial emotional relationality to the world it is possible 
to present a clearly precise description of «personal unity», and therefore 
methodologically to arrive at «the doctrine of the unity of nature, and of the 
unity of each human life», expressing through its structural character the 
«general principle» that determines the constitution of the whole of our reality. 
He conceives this personal unity, which he sought from the perspective of the 
functionality of his metaphysical system, as a «receptacle» or, in other words, 
the «foster-mother» of the origin of all experienced events4. 
In Whitehead’s distinctive version, the originally Platonic concept of 
hypodoché represents a «locus» (the term he uses is chora – following Plato’s 
model) or a kind of «natural matrix», in which there takes place a contact 
between subject and object5. Nevertheless, the chora itself, despite its specific 
interactive nature, remains unchanged6. In this sense it is a kind of general 
functional constant that as a whole is constituting itself continuously in a 
creative process of events7, as it possesses in itself a basic potential – it is a 
sphere of givens that contains all the relations of realising individuals8. Its 
metaphysical dimension resides in the creative dynamic interplay between what 
is actual and what is potential, that is, between what has already happened and 
 
1 The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the 
original version of this text. This paper is based on the study of the same name published in 
Czech at the end of 2017. See J. Svoboda, Whitehead’s Interpretation of Plato’s “Receptacle” and the 
Parallels with the Concept of “Eternal Objects”, «Studia philosophica», 64 (2), 2017, pp. 21-42. 
2 A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, The Free Press, New York 1967, p. 176. 
3 A. N. Whitehead (1861-1947), together with (his former pupil) the English logician and 
philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was the co-author of the essential work in the field 
of the philosophy of mathematics and mathematical logic Principia Mathematica, Vols. I-III,  
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1910-1913. 
4 See A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 187.  
5 Ibidem. 
6 Ibidem, pp. 186-187. 
7 «The creativity is the actualization of potentiality, and the process of actualization is an 
occasion of experiencing. This viewed in conjunction they carry the creativity which drives the 
world. The process of creation is the form of unity of the Universe» (ibidem, p. 179). 
8 Cf. J. Klose, Alfred North Whitehead’s Receptacle, in Beyond Metaphysics? Explorations in Alfred North 
Whitehead’s Late Thought, Ronald Faber, Brian Henning, and Clinton Combs (eds.), Rodopi, 
New York 2010, pp. 162-163. 
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what is yet to happen9 – i.e. within a further context primarily with his work 
Process and Reality10 – a «temporal» (actual) and «eternal» reality forms. In this 
sense, the chora can be regarded as a metaphysical space in which there occurs a 
process of «decisions» and qualitative «limitation»11, by which it is then possible 
for a new event to be realised12. Generally it can be said, therefore, that the 
chora denotes something that has an exceptional capacity to unify the diversity 
of actual events, and in the spirit of its typical manner of being to confer (in an 
ontological sense) comprehensibility upon these fundamental actual individual 
entities. 
 If the chora is the medium by which various actual events are united and 
that because of this functional capacity renders individual entities intelligible 
against the backdrop of the processuality of events, then Whitehead clearly 
introduced this Platonic concept in order to underscore the constant need for 
further clarification that our actions are guided by. Plato thereby exercised a 
distinctive influence on Whitehead by opening up new horizons of inspiration 
in seeking viable paths by which to rationally understand our concrete reality – 
through a consequent type of moderate realism that in a qualitative sense closely 
connects us with living, functioning reality, which is the space of application 
for our everyday active social operation and creative behaviour.  
As the title of this paper essentially suggests, its aim is not to present a 
faithful interpretation of this fundamental but «obscure and difficult» concept 
from Plato13, a kind of Platonic mens auctoris. If Plato and Whitehead both 
consider the chora a principle feature of their metaphysical systems, then for the 
purposes of a possible fundamental comparison of the differences of both 
conceptions, we shall nonetheless first of all briefly outline its original 
conception as Plato presents it especially in the later dialogue Timaeus14. 
 
1. Plato’s concept of hypodoché 
One of the pivotal goals of philosophical investigation in ancient Greece was 
to reach a cognizance of the true essence of things, i.e. an understanding of 
 
9 «This general principle […] can be conceived as the doctrine of the immanence of the past 
energizing in the present» (A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 188). 
10 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Macmillan Company, New York 
1929 (and in the same year in Cambridge University Press). The basis of Whitehead’s 
fundamental philosophical work is the «Gifford Lectures», which were given in 1927-1928 at 
the University of Edinburgh. In 1978 the American publisher Free Press published a 
«corrected edition» of Whitehead’s philosophical work. Under the scholarly guidance of the 
editors David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburn, several errors from both of the previous 
editions, i.e. in the British and American versions, were rectified, and at the same time this 
corrected edition was furnished with a comprehensive glossary.  
11 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, The Free Press, New York 1967, p. 174. 
12 «Unlike Plato, for whom order and reason reside in the ideal form, Whitehead believes it is in 
the chora that decisions are made and values are selected» (E. Mingarelli, Chora and Identity: 
Whitehead’s Re-Appropriation of Plato’s Receptackle, «Process Studies», 44, 1, 2015, pp. 96 ff. Cf. 
also R. Faber, Surrationality and Chaosmos: For a More Deleuzian Whitehead (with a Butlerian 
Intervention), in The Secrets of Becoming. Negotiating Whitehead, Deleuze, and Butler, Roland Faber and 
Andrea M. Stephenson (eds.), Fordham University Press, New York 2011, p. 173. 
13 A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 150. 
14 Plato, Timaeus and Critias, translated into English with an introduction and notes on the text 
by A. E. Taylor, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London 1929. 
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such a reality that is permanent, immutable, and eternal. This vision was based 
on an «intuitive» conviction, or more precisely on the «view» that beyond all 
the infinite mutability of events there is concealed an original unifying 
principle, by which it is possible to substantiate the order, harmony, beauty, 
and exceptional character of the visible world that surrounds us. Plato was 
convinced that we can arrive at the «nature of each thing as it is in itself» only 
by the route of consistently applying the method of fundamental inquiry (or 
perhaps rather «questioning»), i.e. by a dialectic which «demands an account of 
the essence» of each individual entity15. Through active critical discussion, 
which presupposes a bilateral interest of philosophical partners in the 
clarification of a given problem, the dialectical method «forces the mind to 
look upwards», to a cognizance of «what eternally exists» as an agency «to draw 
the soul towards truth»16 – leading the inquirer to the very essence of all that is 
constantly and continually becoming within time. 
 In addition to the unchangeable pattern or type, which can be 
comprehended by means of reason, and its visible imitations, in one of his last 
works Plato differentiates a «third term»17, which he refers to as the 
«receptacle» (hypodoché) – this is a «kind of foster-mother»: literally the «wet 
nurse» (tithéné) of all that has become18. According to Plato, this is distinguished 
precisely by the fact that this third term that cannot be equated with either 
being or becoming is a 
 
natural matrix for all things […], which receives all bodies […] never 
departs from its own quality. (For it is always receiving all things and 
has never anywhere a shape in any way like any of the things that enter 
it […]) […] it is a somewhat invisible and formless, all-receptive and 
partaking of the intelligible in a manner most puzzling and hard to 
grasp19. 
 
15 Plato, Resp. 533b-534b, (The Republic of Plato, translated with an introduction and notes by 
Francis Macdonald Cornford, Oxford University Press, London 1941, pp. 253-255.) 
16 Id., Resp. 527b-529b. (ivi, pp. 244-247.) 
17 Id., Tim. 48e. 
18 Id., Tim. 49a. Here we note that Plato chooses the expression «wet nurse» in order to 
emphasise the Greek term ‘paideia’, meaning «nurture», since «a wet nurse means one who 
nurtures but does not give birth to the child, who rears the children of a different mother». 
Here Plato wishes to intimate that origin or «becoming» is dependent (in addition to ideas and 
their imitations) also upon something else which is just as fundamental, and which it is 
necessary for us take into account within our context. Cf. K. L. Lee, Platons Raumbegriff. Studien 
zur Methaphysik und Naturphilosophie im “Thimaios”, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2001, 
pp. 126-127. 
19 Plato, Tim. 50b-51b. Let us however add that Plato’s God (Démiurgos) does not create from 
nothing (in the sense of creatio ex nihilo). It is the organiser or architect, who has merely 
diversified the individual elements and ordered under the influence of ideas. Even if hypodoché is 
originally entirely indefinite, the functioning of ideas within it gives birth to a kind of course of 
events, in which its (internal) concretisation and differentiation takes place. In connection with the 
above-intimated functional connectedness of tithéné, it is possible to state in general terms that 
it is precisely thanks to this specific character, which is essentially intrinsic to tithéné, that 
hypodoché, in a kind of peculiar indefinite manner, provides the spatial-temporal world with its 
essential (simple) possibility of its formability. In this sense then, tithéné according to Plato 
becomes “liquefied”, “inflamed” and receives further shapes of earth and air (Id., Tim. 52d), 
and in fact contributes to their becoming through rocking, vibration and trembling (Id., Tim. 
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This «pre-cosmic» (präkosmisch)20 and thus primordial location or space, 
i.e. the chora21 (as Plato called this third term or genus (triton allo genos) and as it is 
usually referred to in the literature) – the specific nature of which has the effect 
of suppressing every undesirable scientific tendency of modernity, leading to 
the substitution of this fundamental concept with the meaning of the word 
‘space’, in which sensory objects appear22 – has the capacity to «receive all 
kinds in itself»23 and at the same time is the «mother and receptacle of creation 
visible and sensible generally»24. It is «that in which becoming occurs» (to en hói 
gegnetai)25, and in the sense of «fertile» soil26 is not a «voided» space, so to 
speak27, it is a potential precondition of a kind of course of events that is 
difficult to specify in detail28. From the perspective of this peculiar and 
indefinite «all-receptive» potentiality, which is essentially intrinsic to the chora, 
in relation to the sensory world it reveals itself as a kind of as yet «unfilled» 
location (in pure possibility), which in its own manner or particular style 
confers reality upon the ephemeral phenomena of this visible world.  
Although the chora in itself is permanent, in its manifestations it stylises 
itself as a mere, if nonetheless necessary (continually changing in meaning) 
potential «this or that or thus»29, and as a result it can never be, in itself (through 
 
52e-53a), so that every element has occupied its position even before the becoming of the 
universe. Incidentally, the origin of fundamental triangular surfaces and their combinations also 
precedes the origin of substances-elements within this peculiar «receiver», as can be surmised 
from passages from Id., Tim. 53c - 57d. Cf. D. Machovec, K filozofické interpretaci Platónovy teorie 
vzniku světa v dialogu Timaios (48E až 58C) (On the Philosophical Interpretation of Plato’s Theory of the 
World in the Dialogue of Timaeus (48E to 58C)), in Sborník prací Filosofické fakulty brněnské univerzity, 
E 33, Masaryk University, Brno 1970, pp. 36-37, p. 35. 
20 F. Karfik, Die Beseelung des Kosmos. Untersuchung zur Kosmologie, Seelenlehre und Theologie in Platons 
Phaidon und Timaios, K. G. Saur, München – Leipzig 2004, p. 152 ff. Also cf. W. Scheffel, 
Aspekte der platonischen Kosmologie. Untersuchungen zum Dialog “Timaios”, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1976, p. 
55 ff. 
21 Kyung Jik Lee in his investigation of Plato’s concept of the chora comes to the conclusion 
that it is not identical to the Aristotelian concept of primary substance, nor to the concept of 
geometric space. Rather, according to Lee, it incorporates both of these concepts. Cf. K. J. 
Lee, Platons Raumbegriff. Studien zur Methaphysik und Naturphilosophie im “Thimaios”, p. 151. Dušan 
Machovec states that this fundamental concept of Plato shares with Aristotle’s primary 
substance «only the fact that nothing precedes them, otherwise nothing». See D. Machovec, 
K filozofické interpretaci Platónovy teorie vzniku světa v dialogu Timaios, p. 35. 
22 K. J. Lee, Platons Raumbegriff. Studien zur Methaphysik und Naturphilosophie im “Thimaios”, p. 126 
ff. 
23 Plato, Tim. 50e. 
24 Id., Tim.. 50d-51a. 
25 Id., Tim. 50c-d. (Cf. Platon, Timaios, Kritias, Philebos, in Werke, Band 7, bearbeitet von Klaus 
Widdra. Griechischer Text von Albert Rivaud und Auguste Diès. Deutsche Übersetzung von 
Hieronymus Müller und Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 
Darmstadt, Darmstadt 1990). 
26 Dušan Machovec speaks of tithéné as a «variable» of hypodoché. See D. Machovec, On the 
Philosophical Interpretation of Plato’s Theory of the World in the Dialogue of Timaeus (48E to 58C), p. 36.  
27 Alfred North Whitehead locates a fundamental semantic similarity between Plato’s 
receptacle, Lucretius’s void and Leibniz’s God. He adds: «Also in his general scholium, 
Newton definitely connects the Lucretian Void with the Leibnizian God. For he calls Empty 
space the “sensorium” of God» (A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, c d., p. 138). 
28 Cf. Plato, Tim. 52d-53c. 
29 Id., Tim. 50e. 
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its nature), essentially substituted with the concept of form or quality30. It is 
neither earth, nor water, nor air, but a «genus»31 that cannot be grasped by the 
senses, and simultaneously a (formless) universal receptacle: functionally 
afterwards (with reference to the sensorily perceptible world): the «mother» of 
a child-offspring, literally of a «descendant» (ekgonos)32. As a specific way of 
being of its type, it is not possible to grasp this «eternal and indestructible» 
residual «X» (this general «variable») by means of sensory perception: according 
to Plato, «it is itself apprehended without sensation, by a sort of bastard 
inference, and so hard to believe in. ‘Tis with reference to it, in fact, we dream 
with our eyes open»33. 
This universal «receptacle» as a receiver of forms or ideas (in its 
universality and necessary openness) cannot, due to its variable nature, be 
conceived as a kind of definitive attribute. Through its particular property the 
chora rather points to a certain «exceptional» correlation,34 and it is only in 
relation to this indefinite (residual) variability that individual things become 
«visible».35 In this sense it is pure receptiveness – pure relationality – which is 
to say that it is a part of the cosmos whose specific manner of «self-showing» 
appears as a continuum36 in an «impermanent trace»37. As a universal and 
necessary condition it has the power of «quality» (dynamis)38 and «nature»39, and 
is therefore simultaneously an «invisible and formless» kind of agency in 
 
30 Cf. F. Karfík, Die Beseelung des Kosmos. Untersuchung zur Kosmologie, Seelenlehre und Theologie in 
Platons Phaidon und Timaios, pp. 154-155. Cf. also K. J. Lee, Platons Raumbegriff. Studien zur 
Methaphysik und Naturphilosophie im “Thimaios”, p. 142 ff. 
31 Cf. Plato, Tim., 48e «triton allo genos» (cf. Platon, Timaios, Kritias, Philebos, in Werke, Band 7.) 
32 Id., Tim. 50d. 
33 Id., Tim. 52b.  
34 In contrast with the view that the chora is characterised by its logical ambiguity, in the words 
of Jacques Derrida «alternating between the logic of exclusion and that of participation» – (J. 
Derrida, On the name, Thomas Dutoit (ed.), translated by David Wood, John P. Leavey and Ian 
Mcleod, Stanford University Press, Stanford p. 89), which is incidentally the consequence of an 
undesirable «discursive autarky» (Outi Pasanen) into which the intrinsic interpretation of this 
fundamental concept of Plato’s especially descends, the American philosopher John Sallis 
understands the chora as an «index of a certain differentiation». From the indefinite characteristic 
of «il y a khôra» – (Derrida), Sallis transfers emphasis onto its concrete, thus definite 
manifestation itself: «the chôra». As the starting point of his contemplations he selects the 
passage Tim. 52b («we look at it as in a dream»), in which Plato conceives the substantial 
essence of the chora as «dreaming». However, according to Sallis the dream is not merely 
«mistaking an image for its original» (Plato, Resp. 476c), but reveals precisely «that» which is the 
very cause of the dream. It therefore reveals a certain (relational) correlation between the chora 
and its manifestation – «appearing» (phaínesthai) (Id., Tim. 50c) – thus it shows itself as a certain 
peculiar typic of a specific episodic process of the actualising of the chora, which Sallis terms 
«chorology». As intimated by the passages Id., Tim. 51b and subsequently Id., Tim. 52d – 52e, 
according to John Sallis this concerns «the self-showing moving», which allows us to trace the 
chora, or more precisely the «manner» of its «exceptional» contribution, to the primordial 
formation of reality. In this sense it is then possible to speak of a kind of primordial ichnography 
of «the almost paradoxical structure of this self-showing» of reality. Cf. N. Isar, Chôra: Tracing 
the Presence, «Review of European Studies», 1, 1, 2009, pp. 39-42.  
35 Plato, Tim. 30a. 
36 Cf. A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1928, p. 344. 
37 N. Isar, Chôra: Tracing the Presence, p. 40. 
38 On the issue of «dynamis and the individual being», cf. G. Prauss, Platon und der logische 
Eleatismus, Walter de Gruyter & Co, Berlin 1966, pp. 77-86. 
39 Plato, Tim. 49a. 
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nature; even if it can therefore not be perceived by any of the senses and in 
fact cannot even be clearly thought40, it is nevertheless something natural, thus 
real. In its mutability and impermanence the chora is related to the «naturalness» 
of the world of the senses, just as the «pre-cosmic» space is a place where – like 
in a «mirror»41 – there occurs a «qualitative» reflection of real things (ideas) as 
images (sensibles).  
In sum, beyond all the mutability of phenomena it is necessary to 
presuppose the intermediary reality of the «permanent» unifying principle, 
which as a medium between being and becoming cannot be identified either 
with the divine, or with the human spirit, or with ideas. The chora, being 
formless, can receive any form, and if it is similarly endowed with a real 
capacity to vary endlessly, from the perspective of its («eternal») potency, it 
fundamentally itself defies all spatial-temporal determination; its “pre-cosmic” 
nature only in principle indicates a certain entirely specific, though nonetheless 
indefinite relational connection with regard to this determination. It reveals 
itself as an influence of necessity (expressing itself rather through resistance to 
the rational order) – and therefore as a certain possibility via which divine 
intelligence is manifested in its effective organisation of the world42. 
 
2. Whitehead’s specific interpretation  
A. N. Whitehead approaches the chora from a different point of view. Several 
years of examining pure mathematical relationships brought him to the 
conclusion that the method of mathematical generalisation in his words was 
able to «divest the problem of details irrelevant to the solution»43.  
In an essential connection with this initial hypothesis, Whitehead 
equally necessarily understood that the «natural» structure of our experience 
cannot be contemplated separately from our feelings (and passions). He clearly 
states: «The basis of experience is emotional44. Stated more generally, the basic 
fact is the rise of an affective tone originating from things whose relevance is 
given»45. Assuming the reality of this primary emotional (subject) relation to the 
world – ideas in many respects indisputably inspired by David Hume46 – 
Whitehead simultaneously gained the conviction that it was possible to present 
a «general description of this general unity», i.e. such an all-embracing 
 
40 Plato, Tim. 51a-b, also cf. 52b.  
41 Cf. E. Mingarelli, Chora and Identity: Whitehead’s Re-Appropriation of Plato’s Receptacle, p. 85. 
42 Tim.53b. 
43 A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 187. 
44 Since, as Whitehead adds elsewhere in the cited book «A sort of feeling […] is a recurrence 
which belongs decidedly to the mental side of things» (ivi, p. 39).  
45 Immediately in the very introduction to Adventures of Ideas we learn: «Knowledge is always 
accompanied with accessories of emotion and purpose» (ivi, p. 176, see also p. 4). 
46 Though naturally with the proverbial critical statement that «Hume’s flux of impressions and 
of reactions to impressions, each impression a distinct, self-sufficient existence, was very 
different to the Platonic soul». Whitehead even speaks of «Hume’s mental atomism» in 
epistemology. He states: «Hume enunciates the doctrine that the ultimate elements, subjectively 
given in the activity of knowing, are the impressions of sensations, showering through the 
stream of experience, associated as memories, provocative of emotions and reflections, and 
expectations. But for Hume, each impression is a distinct existence arising in soul from 
unknown causes» (ivi, p. 29; see also p. 125 and 132). 
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description that is divested of the «minor details of humanity»,47 with the same 
apodictic evidence as upon a consistent application of the method of 
mathematical generalisation48. He therefore believed that it was possible to 
grasp in its generality this purely emotional realm (pertaining to, and therefore 
immanently relative to, the subject) – to grasp its concrete goal-oriented 
manifestations – precisely in relation to the direct processuality of events, and 
to express its sense as a whole just as apodictically «evident» as when we 
express for example a geometric sentence, which tells us that the sum of the 
internal angles of every triangle is necessarily equal to a straight angle, i.e. an 
angle with the size of 180 degree49. 
In the engaging book Adventures of Ideas (published 1933), Whitehead in 
his own words presents («with the slightest of changes») a passage from Plato’s 
Timaeus50, and in the terminological spirit of his processual philosophy 
intentionally supplements it with terms such as «personal unity», «events», 
«experience», and «personal identity». I quote: 
 
In addition to the notions of the welter of events and of the forms 
which they illustrate, we require a third term, personal unity. It is a 
perplexed and obscure concept. We must conceive it [as - J.S.] the 
receptacle, the foster-mother as I might say, of the becoming of our 
 
47 Ivi, p. 187. The Czech philosopher and aesthetician Mirko Novák (understanding the prima-
ry «feeling of living being» not as a mere summation of life experiences but as a «dynamic 
whole constantly directed toward the goals of life, the attainment of which is essential to it») 
speaks in this sense of a «unified living totality, aware of the duration of its own life». He un-
derstands this assertion as a «developing system of reactions», which «functionally changes», and 
states: «as soon as Man turns his term-forming process to the contents of his own inner self, of 
whose swirling around a single vital axis he is capable of realising and experiencing in time (i.e. 
if the linkage of an internal agency with an external one takes place), he exhausts the complete 
but entirely subjective and private certainties and evidence that can be expressed by the equa-
tion: I who think = I who am. He thereby arrives at his own self as the fundamental source of 
all certainty and knowledge, believing entirely clearly to distinguish all that is not this self: he 
arrives at the axiom of the noetic subject». If Novák speaks of the non-historicity of values (as against 
their historical uniqueness and unrepeatability), he then emphasises: «The non-historicity of 
values is therefore not their a-historicity, but rather merely a latent historicity, not revealed in 
terms of age». See M. Novák, Hodnoty a dějiny (Values and history), Vydavatelstvo Družstevní 
práce, Praha 1947, pp. 35-36, 83, 92, 122. 
48 Whitehead states: «Wisdom is proportional to the width of the evidence made effective in 
the final self-determination». A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 47, see also p. 187. 
49 However, according to Whitehead, in the time of democracy it is not possible to understand 
philosophy merely as an aggregate of noble sentiments: «Philosophy is not mere collection of 
noble sentiments. A deluge of such sentiments does more harm than good. Philosophy is at 
once general and concrete, critical and appreciative of direct intuition. It is not – or, should not 
be – a ferocious debate between irritable professors. It is a survey of possibilities and their 
comparison with actualities. In philosophy, the fact, the theory, the alternatives, and the ideal, 
are weighed together. Its gifts are insight and foresight, and a sense of the worth of life, in 
short, that sense of importance which nerves all civilized effort. Mankind can flourish in the 
lower stages of life with merely barbaric fleshes of thought. But when civilization culminates, 
the absence of a coordinating philosophy of life, spread throughout the community, spells 
decadence, boredom, and slackening of effort» (ivi, p. 98). 
50 In the footnote he adds: «I have used A. E. Taylor’s translation, with compression and 
changes of phrase» (Plato, Timaeus and Critias, translated by A. E. Taylor, Methuen & Co., 
London 1929. Cf. Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas, p. 187 (footnote 1). 
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occasions of experience. It is there as a natural matrix for all transitions 
of life and is changed and variously figured by the things that enter it; 
so that is differs in its character at different times. Since it receives all 
manner of experiences into its own unity, it must itself bare of all 
forms. We shall not be far wrong if we describe it as invisible, formless, 
and all-receptive. It is a locus which persists and provides an 
emplacement for all occasions of experience. That which happens in it 
is conditioned by the compulsion of its own past, and by the 
persuasion of its immanent ideals51. 
 
As here also – from the above paraphrasing of Whitehead, essentially 
extensifying the sense of this originally Platonic concept – it becomes clear to 
the reader that this does not concern a description of Plato’s vision of the soul, 
but rather «the imposition of unity upon the events of Nature». Whitehead, for 
whom the concept of «events» explains the dynamic character of the universe 
(its processuality), and who understands the universe as a network or structure 
of events within which every individual being is functionally linked with other 
events, then in the conclusion of this same paragraph of chapter XI of the 
book (bearing the apposite title «Objects and Subjects») states in connection 
with the text of Plato’s Timaeus: «These events are together by reason of their 
community of locus [chóra - J. S], and they obtain  their actuality by reason of 
emplacement within this community»52. 
It is precisely within this totally (and hierarchically) inseparable social-
structural context, according to Whitehead, that we can arrive at «the doctrine 
of the unity of nature, and of the unity of each human life?, or, in the words of 
Mirko Novák, «at the primary feeling of living being»53. Only this kind of 
genuinely living and self-forming unity can in this specific way lead us to the 
desired «knowledge of a special strand of unity within the general unity of 
nature» – «It is a locus within the whole, marked out by its own peculiarities, 
but otherwise exhibiting the general principle which guides the constitution of 
the whole»54. 
Whitehead therefore seeks a universal unifying principle, which he 
philosophically conceives as a primary structure of experience, in which the 
relationship between object and subject takes place. The location, perhaps 
better expressed as the permanently living arena, of this fundamental and 
permanent unipolar contact then in its functional originality does not represent 
a mere «empty» (developmental) possibility, potentiality purged of all subjective 
manifestations (with which, as a methodological prerequisite, traditional logic 
in particular operates), but manifests itself rather as a kind of «enlivening» 
manner of being or functioning, thanks to which and within which there 
purposefully takes place an original, meaningful formation of «eternal» (i.e. in 
not occurring in the objective world) and «temporal» actual reality. As a result 
of such a systematic creative enlivening process objective reality becomes 
comprehensible to the subject, not only within the framework of a consistent 
 
51 Ivi, p. 187. 
52 Ibidem.  
53 M. Novák, Hodnoty a dějiny (Values and history), pp. 83. 120, 140. 
54 A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, pp. 187-188. 
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application of mathematical-causal relationships. It should be comprehensible 
– and within this essential context above all – so to speak within the «limits and 
possibilities» of the experiencing subject, i.e. precisely on the basis of the 
comprehensibility of the subject’s own continuous experiencing. A. N. 
Whitehead presents such an interpretation in his fundamental philosophical 
work Process and Reality (published 1929), when he speaks of «eternal objects»55. 
 
3. Parallels with concept of «eternal objects» 
«Eternal objects» are a concept that Whitehead introduces in order to refer, 
within the framework of his metaphysical system, to the necessary manner of 
existence (thus «arising») of pure possibilities in reality. He conceives them as a 
principle of formation of «actual entities» or «actual occasions», thus as a principle 
that confers a certain shape or comprehensible form upon these actualities of 
reality. Eternal objects neither originate nor cease to exist. They are eternal 
because, despite the vicissitudes of individual events, they remain unchanged – 
they persist in time (endurance). From the perspective of their temporal 
constancy they form the original model structures of the universe. In this 
fundamental sense they represent reality, which is of key importance for an 
understanding not only of the functionality of Whitehead’s metaphysical 
conception, but also of the actual goal of his metaphysics: «The endeavour to 
frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which 
every element of our experience can be interpreted»56. 
Whitehead starts out from the general presupposition of a dynamic 
conception of reality, from its goal-orientation, which he understands as a 
creative process of becoming, a continual development towards something 
new. All is therefore subordinate to the general principle of creativity. 
However, creativity in itself contributes nothing: «it is actual» only on the basis 
of its fragmentary manifestations, otherwise it loses its actuality. And it is only 
in this constantly self-actualising sense, as a generally presupposed «ultimate» 
principle, that it becomes a prerequisite for the cementing of plurality into a 
singular entity.  
The singular is therefore constituted as a new element upon a 
background of a plurality of entities. The new element or entity always 
somehow alters the overall «multiplicity», and at the same time, through this 
change, a new entity is produced, which stimulates a process of further 
unifying of plurality and subsequently the becoming of a new entity. In other 
words, the becoming of a new entity essentially generates a unifying of 
plurality. In contrast with the original plurality, there is always the potentiality 
of a new plurality, which precisely through its multiplication by a new entity – 
 
55 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology. (Gifford Lectures Delivered in the 
University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28), D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (eds.), The 
Free Press, New York 1985, pp. 362-363. See also D. W. Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead’s Process 
and Reality, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1966, pp. 20-25. Also see V. M. Root, Eternal 
Objects, Attributes, and Relations in Whitehead’s Philosophy, «Philosophy and Phänomenological 
Research», 14, 2, 1953-1954, pp. 196-204. Also P. Kecskemeti, Whitehead und der Aufstand gegen 
die Metaphysik, «Amerikanische Rundschau», 13, 4, 1948, pp. 40-50. 
56 Specifically, with a fundamental emphasis on the necessary and permanent need for their 
practical «realisation»: «To acquire a coherent system of practicable ideas» (A. N. Whitehead, 
Adventures of Ideas, p. 14. See also A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 3). 
   
Jan Svoboda, Whitehead’s Interpretation of Plato’s «Receptacle» and the Parallel with the 
Concept of «Eternal Objects» 
 






under these new conditions – becomes actual. It therefore in a certain manner 
latently consists in the «retentional»57 basis of all actualities, or more precisely: 
in its manner of being a pure potentiality becomes present, which acts (within 
the framework of new definitions of actuality) – conditionally.  
Therefore, nothing exists other than the process of becoming and 
expiring, wherein that which is a mere potentiality becomes actual and is again 
integrated, together with other events, for a new event. Nothing exists beyond 
that which is actualised. The question therefore concerns the means by which 
the process of becoming or the formation of a new actuality takes place in 
principle. In order to illuminate this ontological problem to the necessary 
degree, at least in a basic outline, it shall be necessary briefly to demarcate the 
path of the original process of becoming of actuality from mere potentiality. 
For a better orientation within this entire complex issue, here at this point we 
intentionally anticipate that the sought after fundamental starting point of the 
process of «becoming» of comprehensibility of reality is integrally linked in 
Whitehead’s work with the concept of «concrescence»,58 thus a «coalescence», and 
therefore – in the etymological sense of the word – this always concerns a 
certain «concretising», which takes place by means of a «coalescence» of eternal 
objects and actual events or a complex of actual events. 
As stated above, Whitehead refers to the individual realisations (he also 
speaks of «final facts») of the most general metaphysical principle of creativity 
as actual entities or actual events. These constitute the fundamental unit of the 
process of events, and they exist so to speak as creativity in singulo. It is not 
possible to go beyond these events, they are complex and mutually 
interdependent elements of our experience. They occupy a spatial-temporal 
location, they have an actual existence, they are singular and mutually 
connected by internal relationships which can be considered a natural part of 
their manner of being59. And they differ from Leibniz’s monads – which are 
«windowless» – precisely in the fact that they are permanently temporally 
variable. 
According to Whitehead, two principles relate to them. The first is 
incorporated within the «ontological principle» and essentially states: the only 
reason is events; to seek a reason means to seek an event60. The second 
principle dictates that each entity must be somehow experienced and felt61 
(note, this primarily concerns a reception of contact between all events, not 
exclusively an “experience” of communicating forms of living beings, beings 
 
57 Id., Adventures of Ideas, p. 150. 
58 Cf. Id., Process and Reality, pp. 358-359. 
59 If we presuppose «the essential interdependence of things», according to Whitehead «it is 
evident that the doctrine involves the negation of “absolute being”». One of the fundamental 
consequences of this approach to reality is that «the scientists are seeking for explanations of 
and not merely for simplified descriptions of their observations» (A. N. Whitehead, Adventures 
of Ideas, p. 113, see also p. 128). 
60 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 18. 
61 Martin Jordan considers Whitehead’s events to be «experiences of feeling». He speaks of a 
dual possible manner of sensation of things: «The Whiteheadian occasions […] are experiences 
of feeling. In all feelings there are things felt and things which feel. The “things felt” are the 
objects for the occasion, the “things which feel” the subject» (M. Jordan, New Shapes of Reality. 
Aspects of A. N. Whitehead’s Philosophy, G. Allen and Unwin, London 1968, p. 54). 
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endowed with consciousness)62. It is in this second ultimate condition that the 
core of Whitehead’s conception of the principle of relativity consists: only that 
which is somehow experienced is real. Therefore, only that which in some 
sense exists has its reason in how it is experienced – or in other words in the 
manner of its experiencing63. 
If only that which can be «somehow» experienced is real, then, 
according to Whitehead, this in its consequence means that every actual event 
(as creativity «above all») manifests its «bipolar» character, thus that it is 
necessary to differentiate between its two corresponding poles, one mental and 
the other physical64. And from this fundamental discovery there ensues for 
Whitehead the no less consequential assertion that all real events in the world 
generally have their spiritual aspect, which is different from this experiencing. 
Each event therefore follows a definite purpose, it is in its essence 
teleologically directed. This spiritual aspect or, in other words, this spiritual or 
conceptual pole is then this intrinsic primordial naturalness, which contains the 
inexhaustible source of all forms – thus all eternal individual beings – that 
constitute this world65. 
Thanks to the presence of the spiritual dimension in every element of 
nature, it is then possible to speak of an intrinsic value of every actual entity, 
which always, in connection with the creativity of progressive events, follows a 
definite purpose, independent of human will (teleology). The physical pole is 
determined by the acting cause (i.e. within the limits of causal relationships), 
the spiritual by the inner teleological cause. The greater the complexity of 
actual events, the proportionally greater is the actual or concrete meaning of 
the teleological cause, which is incidentally confirmed not only the by the 
overall complexity of social structures, but also by their potential susceptibility 
to various, often unforeseeable changes – for example, their ever more 
intensive tendency to significantly «hybridise»66. 
 
62 We ordinarily link the concept of «experience» with consciousness. This is not what 
Whitehead is concerned with. In his philosophical system a definite object such as a table is 
composed of «experience», just as a person or a star is. If we imagine, for example, a certain 
person observing a stone, then both, namely the person and the stone, must be viewed within 
a single framework, and in a certain sense form a «real event», precisely speaking: their 
relationship is at least a potential unity. According to Whitehead it would be possible to 
separate one from the other by means of a clear theoretical construction. The person «grasps» 
the stone in the same manner that the stone «grasps» a certain person – even if with a different 
intensity. The intensity of experience is then determined by the history of the person (and the 
stone). If this person is a sculptor, he or she will see in the stone a different dimension than 
might be seen for example by a bricklayer or a baker. To this extent the prehistory of the 
person and the prehistory of the stone pertain to the whole procedural context of «experience». 
Experience in fact sets out the entire structure - so to speak it constitutes itself. In addition to 
this, it is linked in a complex sense with other «events» which have led to it and thanks to 
which its future shall be influenced.  
63 Cf. ivi, pp. 166-167.  
64 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 239.  
65 It is precisely in this fundamental (strict) teleological sense that reality can receive its 
subjective form. And Whitehead states: «A prehension, however, acquires subjective form, and 
this subjective form is only rendered fully determinate by integration with conceptual 
prehensions belonging to the mental pole of res vera» (ivi, p. 69).   
66 On hybrid forms originating within an environment of dynamic global interactions see, e.g., 
M. Kreuzzieger, Globalization, hybrid growth and critical transculturalism, in J. Svoboda, O. Štěch 
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An actual entity, therefore, generally follows a definite purpose. This 
spiritual direction or structural need creates a potentiality of a future relation-
ship, to which the becoming of a new actual event is directed. Whitehead refers 
to this concrete potentiality, which is a necessary condition of further integra-
tion that all actual individual beings implicitly carry within themselves and to 
whose origin every new event is directed, as a «subjective aim»67. Every actual en-
tity thereby simultaneously becomes a unique reality in the sense of a new pos-
sibility of an actual experienced realisation, which Whitehead claims is itself 
driven, thanks to a systematic endeavour to aim somewhere, by a compulsive 
natural desire, thus by an internal reason, which – unlike the unilaterally ration-
al character of an external cause – furthermore so to speak «yearningly» (or 
perhaps in a Platonic sense erotically) urges (Whitehead speaks of desire, and 
elsewhere refers to the lure of feelings) to be realised, in order to arrive at its op-
timal fulfilment.  
 Whitehead refers to the very constitution of an actual event or its 
grouping (nexus) as «prehension»,68 thus as «grasping» («empowering»)69, which 
arises as a natural (vital) compulsive need or yearning to «drive» to something 
new (creative urge). Actual events are concretised if through their natural urgency 
they have attained successful fulfilment in their optimum (satisfaction)70. 
Therefore, Whitehead’s primary intention, as already intimated above, is to 
 
(eds.), Interkulturní vojna a mír (Intercultural war and peace, Filosofia, Praha 2012, pp. 137-143. 
Multiplications of hybrids within the context of modernisation are dealt with in Bruno Latour’s 
book We Have Never Been Modern, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1993. 
67 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 19. 
68 It is not irrelevant within this context to recall that in the 1960s the term «prehension» was 
used by the Czech philosopher and sociologist J. L. Fischer in his work Skladebná filosofie, 
strukturalismus a dialektika (Compositional philosophy, structuralism and dialectics) – even if without any 
reference to the work of A. N. Whitehead. Fischer differentiates (“entirely in congruence with 
the traditional conception”) three levels of our cognitive faculties: prehensive (perception), 
reprehensive (imagination), and comprehensive (intellectual or reflected). The configuration of 
the prehensive, thus the sensory faculty of this prehensive level, is specific in that it is deter-
mined by «contradictory tendencies». This means that individual sensory acts are characterised 
not only by their objective intention (focus on the intended object). This objective intention is 
nevertheless at the same time anchored in our existential sphere, in our sphere of interest (in 
our existential needs and possibilities). Via the relevant receptors, only those of substantive 
differences are signalled, which have an existential impact for our organism, and at the same 
time in a manner which signals this impact emotionally. The sensory faculty of individual or-
ganisms is then the result of a «dialectical clash of two tendencies», or in other words a level-
ling thereof. From this Fischer extrapolates that although «the real corresponds to every pre-
hended sensory difference and not vice versa, the degree of «objective» diversity of reality is 
greater – even much greater – than that which we are aware of». The fact that our reality is 
prehended means that it is perceived in terms of its qualitative diversity and not recognised in 
the actual sense. To know «anything», according to Fischer, means to «constrict» these qualita-
tive diversities by means of some kind of relationship, to incorporate them into some kind of 
correlation. «The rational is therefore only a relationship and reality only to the extent that we 
have succeeded in relationising it, in introducing it into various numerous relationships»  (J. L. 
Fischer, Compositional philosophy, structuralism and dialectics, «Filosofický časopis», 17, 1, 2013, pp. 
21-22). 
69 Whitehead sometimes uses the term ‘ingression’. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 23 ff. 
Cf. also M. Andrle, Whiteheadova filosofie přírody. (Se zvláštním zřetelem k londýnskému období.) 
(Whitehead’s Philosophy of Nature. (With particular regard to the London period)), nakl. P. Mervart, 
Červený Kostelec 2010, p. 135 ff. 
70 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 83 ff.   
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show that prehension (grasping) does not mean to perceive, but essentially that 
the relationship generally originates within the process (the concrete fact of 
relatedness)71. 
Every process of transition from a certain actual plurality to a final 
unity is primarily a process of concretisation. In this sense Whitehead speaks of 
a concrescence, thus of a coalescence of the eternal object with the actual event. 
Even if the sphere of these potentialities is unlimited, they enter into reality 
only in the conditioned form of characteristic features of actual events72. (Red as 
such does not exist in objective reality without the existence of something that is 
red; its possible existence is potential, i.e. conceivable in pure possibility, only 
until the time that it is linked with an actual event). 
Therefore, for example, red in itself is not an actual entity in the sense 
of any empirical occurrence: it is a pure possibility in the sense of a feature of a 
certain situation. If a relationship is realised between both – e.g. «a red flower» 
– Whitehead then speaks of a coalescence of an eternal object and an actual 
entity. Through this connection, the situation becomes comprehensible to us. 
Eternal reality as initial possibility not subject to change then represents a 
general feature of reality, enabling its comprehension. Although it is a feature 
of reality, which does not exist from the perspective of empirical occurrence, it 
arises on the basis of a coherent series of events as a feature of a situation 
delineating an individual event from the perspective of its meaning. 
This goal-oriented, meaning-ful relational delineation of actual 
individual beings, from the observer’s perspective, appears as their objectifying 
form. However, at the same time the subject itself is constituted through the 
reality of eternal entities (a flower is significant to me in that it is red). The 
colour red as a pure possibility therefore establishes a relationship between the 
seen object and the seeing subject, who meaningfully grasps a certain object 
and thereby receives it, so to speak, as his or her own. From this fundamental 
perspective it is then possible to speak of the internal connection between an 
eternal object and an actual individual being as a «subjective form» of 
manifestation. Whitehead clearly states «There is a concrescence of the initial 
data into the objective datum, made possible by the elimination, and effected 
by the subjective form»73. The subjective form is in fact a way in which the 
subject «purposefully» grasps (prehends) a certain object or fact. Whitehead in 
 
71 Whitehead adds: «Our consciousness does not initiate our models of functioning. We awake 
to find ourselves engaged in process, immersed in satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and actively 
modifying, either by intensification, or by attenuation, or by the introduction of novel 
purposes» (Id., Adventures of Ideas, p. 46. See also Id., Process and Reality, p. 22. 
72 In connection with the «power» of these potential idealities Whitehead comments: «The 
power of an ideal consists in this. When we examine the general world of occurrent fact, we 
find that its general character, practically inescapable, is neutral in respect to the realisation of 
intrinsic value. The electromagnetic occasions and the electromagnetic law, the molecular 
occasions and the molecular law, are all alike neutral. They condition the sort of values which 
are possible, but they do not determine the specialities of value. When we examine the 
specializations of societies which determine values with some particularity, such specializations 
as societies of men, forests, deserts, prairies, icefields, we find, within limits, plasticity. The 
story of Plato’s idea is the story of its energizing within a local plastic environment. It has a 
creative power, making possible its own approach to realization» (Id., Adventures of Ideas, p. 42. 
Cf. also pp. 92-93). 
73 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 221. 
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this sense speaks of «private matters of fact»74, which meaningfully specify 
concrete individual beings or entities.  
Naturally, this is not to say, for example, that the concepts of «red» or a 
«right angle» cannot be perceived in their generality, without us thinking of a 
concrete object. In connection with the above possibility of a manner of 
grasping reality in a subjective form, eternal objects, according to Whitehead, 
have one general and one specific aspect. Without a relationship to concrete 
entities they are «general public facts of the world»75 – they are «particular», and in 
their differentiation from other eternal objects they create a certain contrast76; 
as Whitehead mentions elsewhere in the same book, they are «forms of 
definiteness»77. From the perspective of their immediate concretisation in a 
definite, actual entity, however, they become a certain quality, or, more 
precisely, a characteristic of meaningful delimitation. Whitehead adds that the 
connections of eternal objects are «public», though it is possible to experience 
this connection only «privately»78. 
Eternal objects as concrete «relational» experiences, through their 
permanent subject relatedness, meaningfully present experienced reality, and it 
is therefore possible to understand their relational «subjective form», in 
correlation with the necessity of their processuality, as a permanently 
implemented, or more precisely constituting personal unity. As «public facts of 
the world», eternal objects appear as mere a-subjective general entities. As a 
result it is impossible not to notice the conspicuous similarity of their objective 
form of manifestation – which «forms of definiteness» at the same time 
essentially take on – with the Platonic concept of ideas, which in the Middle 
Ages became one of the cornerstones of the dispute concerning the universal. 
However, even their further connotations of its meaning, whether the concept 
of the universal is interpreted within the traditional limits of moderate realism, 
conceptualism, or nominalism, fail to appreciate Whitehead’s fundamental 
concept in its generality.  
The dissimilarity of these objective forms of «eternal objects» to the 
concept of the «universal» consists in a thorough understanding of the 
relationality of Whitehead’s fundamental concept: «An actual entity cannot by 
described, even inadequately, by universals; because other actual entities do 
enter into the description of any one actual entity»79. From this essential 
standpoint, Whitehead intentionally speaks of envisagement (of the 
«envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects», and thus of a manner of 
«Wesenschau – the envisagement of essence»)80 as opposed to every tendency 
toward generalising abstraction or to any abstract formation, by which it is 
impossible to cover the generality of the given situation without limitation81. 
 
74 Cf. ivi, p. 22. 
75 Ivi, p. 290. 
76 Ivi, p. 48. 
77 Ivi, p. 158. 
78 Ivi, pp. 289-290. 
79 Ivi, p. 48. 
80 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 105. Cf. also id., Adventures of Ideas, p. 68. 
81 Cf. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Bd. II/2: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie 
der Erkenntnis, 6, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 1968, p. 162. Cf. also I. Blecha, Proměny 
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Eternal objects are unthinkable and therefore «do not become» in their 
temporal originality without a relationship to their realisations82. They have a 
«relational essence» and as a result cannot be thought of separately in a 
primarily dynamic-functional sense83. Whitehead concludes: «No reason, 
internal to history, can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another 
flux, should have been illustrated»84. According to the ontological principle it 
applies that: «Everything must be somewhere; and here “somewhere” means 
“some actual entity”»85. 
 
4. Conclusions and epistomiological conjunctions: «eternal objects» and 
General Systems Theory 
From the above observations it is apparent that both Plato and Whitehead 
introduced the concept of the chora into the discussion because they wanted to 
offer a more conceptually concrete explanation for the process whereby actual 
existing individual entities participate in eternal patterns or ideas. The intention 
of both these thinkers was thus to engage in a further fundamental reflection 
on the relationship between being and becoming, or, more precisely, to try to 
offer an overall conception of reality that would allow these essential concepts 
to be viewed in a closer and more complexly clear functional relationship to 
each other.      
In Plato’s conception the chora represents a kind of specific, residual 
substructure – more of a material nature – that has the exceptional capacity to 
act as a medium between the eternal world of ideas and their copies. Because 
Plato does not consider these pale copies to be a part of the eternal world of 
ideas, an intermediary space is required for them, and it is the chora, as a 
specific form of pure relationality, that is to provide them with this. In the chora 
ideas only leave an imprint of themselves, and they are nursed there until the 
time of their realisation in the in the ever changing sensorily perceptible world. 
Plato’s chora is thus a place in which a specific creative relational process occurs 
from which sensory qualities acquire new characteristics. As mere reflections of 
real things (ideas) these characteristic qualities do not exist in their own right, 
and because they are ephemeral and constantly mutable they cannot be 
regarded as real ontological substances. 
For Whitehead, however, the chora is not by nature this kind of residual 
material substructure. In the light of his processual philosophy Whitehead’s 
chora must necessarily be regarded more as a kind of «all-receptive» invariant, 
which derives its existence and functional independence from the natural 
creativity of events. Only on the assumption of the original and permanent 
effectivity of events, which is at the same time «through and through 
 
fenomenologie. Úvod do Husserlovy fenomenologie (Changes of phenomenology. Introduction to Husserl’s 
phenomenology), Triton, Praha 2007, p. 151 ff. 
82 Whitehead clearly states: «The relationship is not a universal. It is a concrete fact with the 
same concreteness as the relata. […] We have to discover a doctrine of nature which express 
the concrete relatedness of physical functionings and mental functioning, of the past with the 
present, and also expresses the concrete composition of physical realities which are individually 
diverse» (A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 157). 
83 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 160. 
84 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 46. 
85 Ibidem. 
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togetherness»86, can the chora be regarded as the metaphysical space of this 
endless structural connectedness between actual entities as the basic 
ontological building blocks of reality. If the chora is in its creative processional 
sense relationality per se, then within the chora, as a functional structural unity, 
the relationship between pure potentialities and their actual entities is formed 
directly, and thus the goal-oriented relationship itself is merely a medium 
between them. Through the goal-oriented focus of every such – more or less 
complex – immanent relationship on fulfilling its purpose, its meaning is 
constituted by the concrete creative act of realisation. 
 The term «eternal objects» is therefore intended to designate something 
which confers comprehensibility upon an experienced reality. It must have the 
capacity to meaningfully delineate an experience of an event (e.g. red) in such a 
manner that the context of the event is comprehensible within the framework 
of continuous experience. At the same time it must be such a reality which we 
encounter within the framework of general experience87. Within our 
interpretative context there indeed arises a further, no less fundamental 
philosophical question, which we could essentially formulate as follows: what 
do we see in our direct, essentially constituting view, what in this is not an 
individual being, but despite this is distinguished by the necessity of its internal 
structure, i.e. what in experience corresponds to the above-outlined 
fundamental description of the term «eternal objects», which thanks to its 
relational character are «prehensively» presented (concretised) by subjective 
forms in individual intended objects? Therefore, the fundamental question is: 
what in ordinary experience corresponds in principle to the pure potentialities, 
which, owing to their relational «choric» nature, as suggested above, are 
rendered permanently present as generally intelligible functional wholes of our 
reality.  
One possible answer to this fundamental question is offered by the 
systems theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy88. In Modern Theories of Development 
(1928), Bertalanffy wrote: 
 
Mechanism […] provides us with no grasp of the specific characteristic 
of organisms, of the organization of organic process among one 
another, of organic “wholeness”, of the problem of the origin of 
organic “teleology”, or of the historical character of organisms […]. We 
must therefore try to establish a new standpoint which – as opposed to 
mechanism – take account of organic wholeness, but […] treats it in a 
manner which admits of scientific investigation89. 
 
 
86 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 174. 
87 «It is the task of philosophy to work at the concordance of ideas conceived as illustrated in 
the concrete facts of the real world. It seeks those generalities which characterize the complete 
reality of fact, and apart from which any fact must sink into an abstraction. […] Also the 
sciences should find their principles in the concrete facts which a philosophic system presents» 
(A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 146). 
88 L. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, George Braziller, New York 1968.  
89 L. Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development, 1928, reprint, Harper & Row, New York 1962. 
Cf. D. Polkinghorne, Methodology for the Human Science: Systems of inquiry, Suny Press, New York 
1983, p. 143. 
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Systems theory (or General Systems Theory) examines the functioning 
of general systems by describing the model manners of their organisation, i.e. 
their structures. It therefore seeks to identify the primary model structures that 
constitute these systems as wholes. The system thus functions independently 
of its parts, just as the structure of a certain melody is independent of particular 
tones or the geometric configuration of a triangle is independent of the fact 
that it is made up of straight lines. The formation of the whole90 must 
therefore have a different manner of organisation, i.e. structure, than the mere 
sum of its individual parts. Unlike such closed systems with impermeable 
boundaries, Bertalanffy examines open systems, which are capable of admitting 
stimuli into their environment. He discovers that it is not the initial conditions 
of living systems that are the sole determining factor of their final state, but by 
independent structures of the system’s organisation as such. These 
independent structures manifest different behave in a different way: despite 
admitting chance stimuli into their environment these systems arrive at the 
same locations (states) irrespective of the different initial conditions they set 
out from and in different manners. He refers to the attainment of these final 
states as «equifinal behaviour», and according to Bertalanffy these systems have 
«goals of their own», thus through their behaviour they follow a certain 
purpose91. 
 As Jan Kamarýt notes: 
 
General Systems Theory is a particular interdisciplinary branch of 
knowledge, attempting a systematic construction of a model and 
applicable theory and meta-theory of systems. […] It performs a 
classification and analysis of systems of various types. […] Von 
Bertalanffy devotes special attention to the behaviour of open systems. 
His initial hypothesis is the observation that living organisms are typical 
open systems, which continuously exchange material, energy and 
information elements with their environment. As a consequence of this 
they are internally in a state of peculiar stationary dynamic balance, or 
approach the attainment thereof, and in this case they have specific 
traits of organised and integrated systems. With the aid of this model, 
substantial progress has been made in understanding the integral 
functioning of the organism, its origin and development, its internal 
structures and its connections with the environment92.  
 
The sought conjunction between systems theory and the relational 
conception of Whitehead’s eternal entities is genetically contained precisely 
 
90 «The idea behind general systems theory is that there is a general ideal form which is 
isomorphic to all systems. This general form is the object of inquiry, and the level of inquiry is 
the properties of systems, not specific system themselves» (D. Polkinghorne, Methodology for the 
Human Science: Systems of inquiry, p. 143). 
91 D. Polkinghorne, Methodology for the Human Science: Systems of inquiry, p. 146. Cf. also L. 
Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory as Integrating Factor in Contemporary Science, in Akten des XIV. 
Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie, Wien: 2.-9.  September 1968. Band II, Herder, Wien 1968, 
pp. 335-340. 
92 J. Kamarýt, Klasifikace a význam systémových teorií (Classification and importance of systems theories), 
«Filosofický časopis», 18, 1, 1969, pp. 56-60, p. 58.  
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within Bertalanffy’s specific noetic approach to the conception of reality. 
General Systems Theory does not engage in an empirical investigation of 
individual entities. It is a science of the entities of wholes. Like the theory of 
emergent or «creative» (Julian Huxley) development93, it is based on a 
philosophically realist position. In the foundation of its essential starting points 
it strictly rejects the use of any hypothetical terms, which «merely defer the 
mystery», and offers an explanation of creative development from the «thing 
itself»94.  
However, systems theory does not satisfy itself merely with the asser-
tion that these wholes «emerge», that they somehow «surface» from the depths 
of development. «From where these new wholes originate, we do not know», 
states Mirko Novák95. Systems theory turns its attention to living, functioning 
reality, to the reality that is the space of application of our everyday, active so-
cial operation and creative behaviour. In the spirit of its functionalism, it points 
to the fact that the behaviour of an individual becomes comprehensible only 
within the framework of relationships (interactions), thus within the procedural 
contexts which originate within a certain functioning system as a whole96. And 
it is these unique actual wholes97 – not excepting social wholes or nikas – that 
systems theory in principle qualitatively conceives of as functions, which, as 
might reasonably be expected, are more or less responsibly and thus freely 
adopted by individuals according to their own natural orientation and general 
experience, either volitionally or emotionally, as their own intrinsic asubjective 
reality, and therefore as their «surroundings». From the perspective of their 
natural procedural essence they are necessarily able to subjectively perceive them 
 
93 In the 1930s the theory of emergent development was defended by the Czech philosopher 
Josef Tvrdý (following primarily from the positivist tradition of Czech philosophy). Tvrdý de-
fines the origin of the term emergence as follows: «The term ‘emergent’ (newly surfacing) orig-
inates from a situation in which, in development, at each new degree new attributes emerge, 
which differentiate phenomena that have attained a higher degree of development from ele-
ments by means of an analysis of discovered phenomena, which are composed and which per-
tain to a lower level of development. These attributes are therefore not a mere resultant ele-
ment, since they are something entirely new, as if suddenly emerging. However, the newness of the 
quality does not see the emergent development only upon the origin of life, like the vitalists, 
but already in “dead” matter, e.g. upon the origin of chemical compounds formed by chemical 
synthesis». It is precisely these manifestations of discontinuity, always bringing something new, 
that point not only to the fact that in every physical and organic formation there is a certain 
psychological correlate (C. L. Morgan), but that they form their own development, and as such 
are a document of emergence. See J. Tvrdý, Nová filosofie. Analysa dnešní filosofické situace (A new 
philosophy. Analysis of the current philosophical situation), nakl. Volné myšlenky, Praha 1932, p. 100 ff. 
94 In this it differs from vitalism, contemplating a hidden life force. Cf. ivi, p. 99. 
95 See M. Novák, Hodnoty a dějiny (Values and history), p. 105. 
96 «As regards “functionalism”, this has frequently been considered – in the last 20 years – the 
“most widespread” alternative to any delineated dualism» (M. Dokulil, Problém “mysli a těla” (The 
“mind” and “body” problem), «Filosofický časopis», 48, 1, 2000, p. 568 ff. 
97 These units (e.g. family, state, forest, sea etc.) are referred to by ecologists using the term 
nika. Kohák explains this as follows: «Not individuals, but the structure of the whole defines 
roles into which beings are born and which then define their life’s task and course. Functions, 
tasks, niches – or, using a word popularized in Amerika by the British ecological classic, 
Charles Elton, in the 1920s, nikas – are what is primary, shaping individual beings, not the 
other way» (E. Kohák, The Green Halo. A Bird’s-Eye View of Ecological Ethics, with a foreword by 
Holmes Rolston, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle 2000, p. 91. 
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as comprehensible98. Furthermore, with the qualitative possibility of compre-
hending also the social dimension of experienced reality in fundamental corre-
lations in terms of values, a path emerges99 which, in the typical manner of a 
dynamic conception of reality, does not lead to the often condemned creation 
of an undesirable dividing line between «Geisteswissenschaften» and the natural 
sciences100.  
As appositely noted in this urgent critical respect by the contemporary 
influential American sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson: 
 
To grasp the present human condition it is necessary to add the 
biological evolution of species and the circumstances that led to its 
prehistory. This task of understanding humanity is too important and 
too daunting to leave exclusively to the humanities. Their many 
branches, from philosophy to law to history and the creative arts, have 
described the particularities of human nature back and forth in endless 
permutations, albeit laced with genius and in exquisite detail. But they 
have not explained why we possess our special nature and not some 
other, out of a vast number of conceivable natures. In that sense, the 
humanities have not achieved nor will they ever achieve a full 
understanding of the meaning of our species’ existence101. 
 
98 As Whitehead generally states: «We can only understand a society by knowing what of 
people undertook what sort of functions in that society» (A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 
p. 78, see also p. 140). 
99 Otakar A. Funda states: «To the question of what is reality and the relations corresponding 
to its situation, there is no static answer. It is necessary to configure this answer continually, 
patiently, rationally and exactly, and to correct it continually precisely in relation toward the 
relations of the addressed problem». Funda conceives reality in its wholeness as a «complexity 
of the complementarity of components in correlations, continuity and contexts» (O. A. Funda, 
Znavená Evropa umírá. [Tired Europe is dying], Karolinum, Praha 2002, p. 114 and also O. A. 
Funda, Když se rákos chvěje nad hladinou. Fragmenty – texty. (When the reed trembles above the surface. 
Fragments – texts), Karolinum, Praha 2009, p. 111. 
100 O. A. Funda, Racionalita versus transcedence. Spor Hanse Alberta s moderními teology (Rationality 
versus transcedence. Hans Albert’s controversy with modern theologians), Filosofia, Praha 2013, p. 16. 
Also, O. A. Funda, Když se rákos chvěje nad hladinou. Fragmenty - texty. (When the reed trembles above 
the surface. Fragments – texts), p. 136. 
101 E. O. Wilson, The Meaning of Human Existence, Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York 
and London, 2014. p. 17. Cf. also J. Svoboda Sr. J. Svoboda, The Platonic Receptacle (Hypodoché), 
Whitehead’s Philosophy, and Genome Evolution, «Viruses», 9, 381, 2017. The article can be found at 
the following link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/9/12/381. 
